Vendor Compensation as an Approach for State  Amazon  Laws: Part 2 by Gamage, David & Heckman, Devin J.
Maurer School of Law: Indiana University
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty Faculty Scholarship
2012
Vendor Compensation as an Approach for State
"Amazon" Laws: Part 2
David Gamage
Indiana University Maurer School of Law, dgamage@indiana.edu
Devin J. Heckman
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the E-Commerce Commons, and the Taxation-State and Local Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty
Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Articles by Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gamage, David and Heckman, Devin J., "Vendor Compensation as an Approach for State "Amazon" Laws: Part 2" (2012). Articles by
Maurer Faculty. 2432.
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/2432
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2128897
Vendor Compensation as an Approach
For State ‘Amazon’ Laws: Part 2
by David Gamage and Devin J. Heckman
Introduction
Taxation of interstate electronic commerce (or
e-commerce) has become one of the hottest topics in
state and local tax scholarship. In the first of this
two-part series, we surveyed the landscapes of the
constitutional impediments to states taxing inter-
state e-commerce transactions and of the states’
attempts to nevertheless raise revenue from these
transactions through the use of ‘‘Amazon’’ laws.1 We
expressed skepticism that any of the previously used
Amazon-law techniques would prove effective and
explained the need for an alternative approach for
taxing interstate e-commerce.
In this article, the second of our two-part series,
we propose a novel solution based on fully compen-
sating remote vendors for all tax reporting and
compliance costs. To that end, we dispute the con-
ventional wisdom on the merits of Quill and on how
the case has been understood. We argue that prop-
erly interpreted, Quill provides a near ideal frame-
work for determining when states should be allowed
to subject remote e-commerce vendors to sales and
use taxation. Crucially, we argue that Quill should
prevent states from taxing remote e-commerce ven-
dors only to the extent that doing so would burden
interstate commerce. Quill is not entirely clear re-
garding what constitutes a burden on interstate
commerce. Yet we contend that both the text of Quill
and the policy rationales underlying the decision
best support an interpretation that the burden on
interstate commerce that concerned the Quill Court
results only when a state imposes tax collection
costs on out-of-state vendors.
In other words, we argue that interstate com-
merce is not burdened under Quill merely because a
sales transaction between a state resident and an
out-of-state vendor bears the economic incidence of a
state tax.2 Instead, interstate commerce is burdened
only when an out-of-state vendor bears reporting or
compliance costs as a result of a state’s imposing tax
collection duties on the out-of-state vendor.3 Al-
though this distinction has not previously been
1David Gamage and Devin J. Heckman, ‘‘Vendor Compen-
sation as an Approach for State ‘Amazon’ Laws: Part 1,’’ State
Tax Notes, Aug. 6, 2012, p. 385, Doc 2012-13644, or 2012 STT
151-4
2The term ‘‘economic incidence’’ refers to the ultimate
effect of a tax or subsidy on the cost or price of a good. Who
bears a tax or subsidy is a function of the relative price
elasticities of supply and demand and is not fixed by who has
a legal obligation to pay the tax. See Don Fullerton and
Gilbert E. Metcalf, ‘‘Tax Incidence,’’ in 4 Handbook of Pub.
Econ. 1787, 1791 (Alan J. Auerbach and Martin Feldstein
eds., 2002).
3As we will discuss in more depth infra in notes 35-37 and
accompanying text, sales transactions between in-state resi-
dents and out-of-state vendors already bear the economic
incidence of many state taxes, and that has not been viewed
as constitutionally problematic. Most notably, many states
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analyzed in any depth, our interpretation of Quill is
consistent with most of what has been written about
the decision.4
Under Quill, interstate commerce
is burdened only when an
out-of-state vendor bears reporting
or compliance costs as a result of
a state’s imposing tax collection
duties on the out-of-state vendor.
What previous commentators have largely failed
to recognize, however, is that this distinction poten-
tially offers the states a constitutionally permissible
approach for partially subjecting remote vendors to
use taxes. Moreover, our proposed approach should
not require the Supreme Court to revisit Quill, or
Congress to pass enabling legislation. Rather, we
argue that a state desiring to subject remote vendors
to its use tax should have only to adequately com-
pensate the remote vendors for the compliance and
reporting costs thereby imposed.5
Because we conclude that the burden on inter-
state commerce at issue in Quill results from impos-
ing reporting and compliance costs on out-of-state
vendors, adequately compensating those vendors for
those costs would completely alleviate the burden on
interstate commerce. The states would benefit from
our approach because adequately compensating for
tax collection costs should result in each state losing
only a small fraction of the potential revenue avail-
able from taxing interstate e-commerce. Yet as the
Court observed in Quill, without adequate compen-
sation for tax collection costs, a remote vendor
selling across the United States might face a sub-
stantial burden from the aggregate costs of comply-
ing with the ‘‘virtual welter of complicated obliga-
tions’’ imposed by the ‘‘nation’s 6,000-plus taxing
jurisdictions.’’6 Our proposed approach of ad-
equately compensating remote vendors for all tax
collection costs would thus allow the states to cap-
ture most of the potential revenue available from
taxing interstate e-commerce while still not burden-
ing interstate e-commerce with excess tax collection
costs.
Adequately compensating those
vendors for reporting and
compliance costs would
completely alleviate the burden on
interstate commerce.
Previous scholarship has generally viewed the
courts as facing a dilemma between either (a) deny-
ing states the right to tax interstate e-commerce and
thus effectively granting remote e-commerce ven-
dors an unjustified tax advantage over their in-state
competitors,7 or (b) allowing states the right to tax
interstate e-commerce and thus potentially disad-
vantaging multistate e-commerce vendors — who
might then be burdened by tax compliance costs
from each of the nation’s 6,000-plus taxing jurisdic-
tions,8 whereas their local competitors would face
compliance costs only wherever they have a physical
presence. Our proposal navigates between those two
undesirable extremes. By permitting state and local
taxing jurisdictions to tax remote vendors if, and
only if, the remote vendors are adequately compen-
sated for all tax compliance costs, our approach
already impose use taxes on purchases their residents make
from out-of-state vendors that are not subject to sales taxa-
tion. Compliance with those use taxes is notoriously low, but
the constitutionality of those use taxes highlights that the
Quill decision prevents states only from subjecting remote
vendors to tax collection costs. States can and do levy taxes
for which the economic incidence falls on sales transactions
between their residents and remote e-commerce vendors.
4E.g., Walter Hellerstein, ‘‘State Taxation of Electronic
Commerce,’’ 52 Tax L. Rev. 425, 439 (1997) (summarizing
Quill as focusing ‘‘on the burdens the tax collection obligation
imposed on interstate commerce’’); Bradley Joondeph, ‘‘Re-
thinking the Role of the Dormant Commerce Clause in State
Tax Jurisdiction,’’ 24 Va. Tax Rev. 109, 120 (2004) (‘‘Although
North Dakota clearly had jurisdiction over the value it sought
to tax — the use of furniture in North Dakota — imposing a
compliance obligation on Quill violated the dormant Com-
merce Clause’’); John A. Swain, ‘‘State Income Tax Jurisdic-
tion: A Jurisprudential and Policy Perspective,’’ 45 Wm. &
Mary L. Rev. 319, 341 (2003). (‘‘We now turn to Quill. Here,
the Court is not concerned with the economic impact of the
tax liability, but with the compliance burden of reporting tax
to multiple jurisdictions with non-uniform tax rules.’’)
5Related to our argument, John L. Mikesell has previously
proposed that Congress should authorize states to levy use
taxes on remote vendors if they adequately compensate the
remote vendors for compliance costs. ‘‘Remote Vendors and
American Sales and Use Taxation: The Balance Between
Fixing the Problem and Fixing the Tax,’’ 53 Nat’l Tax J. 1273
(2000). However, to our knowledge, we are the first to argue
that the Court’s commerce clause jurisprudence already per-
mits the states to levy use taxes on remote vendors if the
states adequately compensate for all compliance costs.
6Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 313 n.6 (1992)
(‘‘Similar obligations might be imposed by the Nation’s 6,000-
plus taxing jurisdictions’’); see also Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v.
Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 759-760 (1967) (‘‘Many
variations in rates of tax, in allowable exemptions, and in
administrative and record-keeping requirements could en-
tangle [a mail-order house] in a virtual welter of complicated
obligations’’).
7See, e.g., David Brunori, ‘‘It’s Time to Overturn Quill,’’
State Tax Notes, Feb. 15, 2010, p. 497, Doc 2010-2948, or 2010
STT 30-2.
8Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc., 386 U.S. at 759-760.
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would place remote vendors and their in-state com-
petitors on a far more level playing field.
Moreover, our proposal would give incentives to
state and local taxing jurisdictions for simplifying
their sales and use tax regimes because they would
be forced to internalize the remote vendors’ costs of
complying with those regimes.9 Our approach thus
avoids the concern that permitting states to tax
interstate e-commerce might allow the states to
create complicated sales and use tax regimes as
protectionist bulwarks against out-of-state competi-
tors.
Quill, Compliance Costs, and the Solution of
Adequate Vendor Compensation
Numerous commentators have argued that Quill
is inappropriate for the Internet age and that the
decision should be overturned.10 Yet we see no indi-
cation that the Supreme Court intends or even has
reason to revisit Quill.11 Accordingly, the states have
generally attempted to work within the Quill frame-
work when designing their sales and use taxes.12
There are two justifications for Quill’s physical
presence rule: preventing burdens on interstate
commerce and stare decisis.13 We argue that the
burden on interstate commerce that troubled the
Court in Quill arises solely from the potential for
remote vendors to be subject to excess tax compli-
ance costs. Hence, properly implemented, our pro-
posed solution of adequate vendor compensation
would completely alleviate any potential for burden-
ing interstate commerce. We further argue that our
proposed approach should survive any constitu-
tional challenge based on stare decisis, because the
lack of any potential for burdening interstate com-
merce makes our proposal different in kind from the
tax statutes that the Quill decision ruled unconsti-
tutional.
A. The Burden on Interstate Commerce
in Quill
In moving beyond its old, formalistic dormant
commerce clause jurisprudence, the Court has
repeatedly emphasized ‘‘the importance of looking
past ‘the formal language of the tax statute [to] its
practical effect.’’’14 As the Court explained in
Commonwealth Edison:
The Court has rejected the notion that state
taxes levied on interstate commerce are per se
invalid. . . . In reviewing commerce clause
challenges to state taxes, our goal has instead
been to ‘‘establish a consistent and rational
method of inquiry’’ focusing on ‘‘the practical
effect of a challenged tax.’’15
In evaluating whether the dormant commerce
clause bars any state action, the threshold question
then must be whether the state action would actu-
ally burden interstate commerce. The commerce
clause should not bar a state from taking action that
would not burden interstate commerce. As the Court
explained in Quill:
The Commerce Clause and its nexus require-
ment are informed not so much by concerns
about fairness for the individual defendant as
by structural concerns about the effects of state
regulation on the national economy. Under the
Articles of Confederation, state taxes and du-
ties hindered and suppressed interstate com-
merce; the Framers intended the Commerce
Clause as a cure for these structural ills. It is in
this light that we have interpreted the negative
implication of the Commerce Clause. Accord-
ingly, we have ruled that that Clause . . . bars
state regulations that unduly burden inter-
state commerce.16
Crucially, the Court has ‘‘recognized that, with
certain restrictions, interstate commerce may be
required to pay its fair share of state taxes.’’17 Or, in
other words, the ‘‘Court has acknowledged that ‘a
State has a significant interest in exacting from
interstate commerce its fair share of the cost of state
government.’’’18 Perhaps most to the point, the Court
said in Commonwealth Edison:
To accept appellants’ apparent suggestion that
the Commerce Clause prohibits the States
9For discussions of the theory behind causing economic
actors to ‘‘internalize’’ the effects of ‘‘externalities,’’ see, for
example, David Gamage, ‘‘Taxing Political Donations: The
Case for Corrective Taxes in Campaign Finance,’’ 113 Yale
L.J. 1283, 1292-1294 (2004), and David Gamage and Darien
Shanske, ‘‘Three Essays on Tax Salience: Market Salience
and Political Salience,’’ 65 Tax L. Rev. 19, 72-73 (2012),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1779382.
10See Arthur R. Rosen and Matthew P. Hedstrom, ‘‘Quill —
Stare at the Decisision,’’ State Tax Notes, June 27, 2011, p. 931
n.6, Doc 2011-11848, or 2011 STT 123-2.
11See id. at 935 (‘‘From the Court’s perspective its job is
done; it has already spoken’’). Note, however, that we are not
Court watchers and that we do not intend anything in this
article to be understood as predicting how the Supreme Court
might rule if it actually takes a case evaluating any of the new
state Amazon laws.
12See id. at 931.
13See Gamage and Heckman, supra note 1.
14Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 310 (1992)
(quoting Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274,
279 (1977)).
15Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609,
615 (1981) (citations omitted) (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Comm’r of Taxes of Vt., 445 U.S. 425, 443 (1980)).
16Quill, 504 U.S. at 312 (citation omitted).
17D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24, 31 (1988).
18Commonwealth Edison, 453 U.S. at 616 (quoting Wash.
Revenue Dep’t v. Ass’n of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S.
734, 748 (1978)).
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from requiring an activity connected to inter-
state commerce to contribute to the general
cost of providing governmental services
. . . would place such commerce in a privileged
position. But as we recently reiterated, ‘‘it was
not the purpose of the commerce clause to
relieve those engaged in interstate commerce
from their just share of state tax burden even
though it increases the cost of doing busi-
ness.’’19
As those cases indicate, the Court’s modern com-
merce clause jurisprudence is not designed to place
interstate commerce in a tax-advantaged position
with respect to intrastate commerce20 — ‘‘even inter-
state business must pay its way.’’21 A state tax that
equally burdens both interstate and intrastate
transactions should not run afoul of the commerce
clause, because that tax would not burden interstate
commerce as compared with intrastate commerce.
Why then did Quill hold that a state may not
apply its use tax to remote vendors lacking a physi-
cal presence within the state when the tax rate
levied on interstate transactions would have been
the same as that levied on intrastate transactions?
The Court’s reason cannot have been that the com-
merce clause shields remote vendors from paying
the same taxes or bearing the same compliance
obligations as do in-state vendors. That would di-
rectly contradict the Court’s repeated proclamations
that the purpose of the commerce clause is not ‘‘to
relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from
their just share of state tax burden even though it
increases the cost of doing business.’’22 Importantly,
the Quill majority specified that it was upholding
the physical presence rule because ‘‘it is not incon-
sistent with Complete Auto’’ and the other modern
commerce clause cases.23 And the only justification
for Quill that would be consistent with Complete
Auto and with the Court’s other articulations of
modern commerce clause jurisprudence must be
that allowing the states to apply their use taxes to
remote vendors lacking physical presence would
result in those vendors bearing greater costs than do
in-state vendors.
Quill indeed explained how allowing states to
impose use tax compliance obligations on remote
vendors could result in those vendors bearing
greater costs compared with vendors that operate
solely within a single state. Quoting Bellas Hess,
Quill’s entire discussion of how allowing states to
impose use tax obligations on remote vendors might
burden interstate commerce revolved around the
‘‘virtual welter of complicated obligations’’ that a
vendor operating in multiple taxing jurisdictions
might face.24 Because Quill’s articulation of the
potential burden on interstate commerce is crucial
to our argument, it is worth quoting the relevant
discussion from Quill in full:
North Dakota’s use tax illustrates well how a
state tax might unduly burden interstate com-
merce. On its face, North Dakota law imposes a
collection duty on every vendor who advertises
in the State three times in a single year. Thus,
absent the Bellas Hess rule, a publisher who
included a subscription card in three issues of
its magazine, a vendor whose radio advertise-
ments were heard in North Dakota on three
occasions, and a corporation whose telephone
sales force made three calls into the State, all
would be subject to the collection duty. What is
more significant, similar obligations might be
imposed by the Nation’s 6,000-plus taxing ju-
risdictions. See National Bellas Hess, Inc. v.
Department of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753,
759-760 . . . (noting that the ‘‘many variations
in rates of tax, in allowable exemptions, and in
administrative and recordkeeping require-
ments could entangle [a mail-order house] in a
virtual welter of complicated obligations’’).25
To repeat ourselves for emphasis, the above para-
graph is the entirety of Quill’s analysis regarding
how allowing states to apply their use taxes to
remote vendors might burden interstate commerce.
As the quoted paragraph makes clear, the Court was
concerned with the imposition of a ‘‘collection duty’’
on remote vendors and in particular with the fear
that a remote vendor might be entangled in a
‘‘‘virtual welter of complicated obligations’’’ imposed
by the ‘‘nation’s 6,000-plus taxing jurisdictions.’’26
Consistent with the Court’s modern commerce
clause jurisprudence, Quill was thus justified based
on the fear that overlapping compliance burdens
from multiple jurisdictions could result in multi-
state vendors bearing greater costs than single-state
vendors. Quill was not based on any notion that
remote vendors should be placed in a tax-
advantaged position as compared with single-state
vendors.
Moreover, Quill was correct in concluding that
allowing states to impose use tax compliance obliga-
tions on remote vendors could burden interstate19Id. at 623-624.
20Id.
21Postal Tel.-Cable Co. v. Richmond, 249 U.S. 252, 259
(1919); see also W. Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S.
250, 254 (1938).
22Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100, 108 (1975);
see also Commonwealth Edison, 453 U.S. at 624-625.
23Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 311 (1992).
24Id.
25Id.
26Id. (quoting Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of
Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 760 (1967)).
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commerce compared with intrastate commerce.
Whereas a vendor operating exclusively within a
single state must bear only the tax collection costs
imposed by that state’s sales or use tax, in the
absence of a physical presence rule, an e-commerce
vendor operating in many states could bear tax
collection costs from the use tax of each state to
which the vendor ships goods. The combined costs of
coping with multiple states’ use tax regimes could
greatly exceed the costs of dealing with only a single
state’s regime, thus forcing vendors wanting to sell
to multiple states to face higher aggregate compli-
ance costs than would vendors selling only within a
single state.27
As in Quill, the only discussion in Bellas Hess
about how allowing states to impose use tax compli-
ance obligations on remote vendors might burden
interstate commerce relies on the overlapping com-
pliance duties that could be imposed by multiple
jurisdictions.28 Again, it is worth quoting that dis-
cussion in full:
And if the power of Illinois to impose use tax
burdens on National were upheld, the result-
ing impediments on the free conduct of its
interstate business would be neither imaginary
nor remote. For if Illinois can impose such
burdens, so can every other State, and so,
indeed, can every municipality, every school
district, and every other political subdivision
throughout the Nation with power to impose
sales and use taxes. The many variations in
rates of tax, in allowable exemptions, and in
administrative and record-keeping require-
ments could entangle National’s interstate
business in a virtual welter of complicated
obligations to local jurisdictions with no legiti-
mate claim to impose ‘‘a fair share of the cost of
the local government.’’ The very purpose of the
Commerce Clause was to ensure a national
economy free from such unjustifiable local en-
tanglements.29
Both Quill and Bellas Hess thus justify the physi-
cal presence requirement based on the fear that a
mail-order vendor (or e-commerce vendor) selling
across the United States could face high aggregate
compliance costs because of the nation’s many tax-
ing jurisdictions. This fear appears to have been
magnified by the concern that there is no necessary
connection between the compliance costs imposed by
a state or local jurisdiction’s use tax regime and the
magnitude of sales a vendor conducts within that
state or local jurisdiction.30 A small state or local
jurisdiction could potentially impose compliance
costs larger than the actual amount of sales made
into the jurisdiction if the level of sales were suffi-
ciently small and the jurisdiction’s use tax regime
sufficiently complicated.
The physical presence rule of the nexus require-
ment might thus be viewed as a mechanism for
creating a fair apportionment test for tax compli-
ance costs analogous to the fair apportionment test
for direct tax costs in the second prong of the
Complete Auto test.31 Rather than attempting to
devise a rule for what minimum amount of sales —
beyond that required by the due process clause —
would justify a jurisdiction’s imposing compliance
burdens on remote vendors, the Court instead
adopted the bright-line physical presence rule.32
Again, the Court’s motive appears to have been to
prevent jurisdictions from disproportionately bur-
dening remote vendors with excess compliance costs.
But for the concern about excess tax compliance
costs, there would be no need to ensure fair appor-
tionment of tax compliance costs, and there would
consequently be no need for Quill’s physical pres-
ence rule.
Even Amazon — ‘‘the No. 1 Internet retailer’’ and
‘‘lead dog when it comes to fighting the online tax
issue’’33 — publicly defends its opposition to the
states’ extending their use tax regimes to
e-commerce based on the same concern about excess
compliance costs as relied on in Quill and Bellas
Hess. As The Sacramento Bee reports, ‘‘Amazon says
it isn’t opposed to an Internet sales tax. It just
doesn’t want to deal with the complexity of 7,500
different tax jurisdictions in the United States.
Founder and Chief Executive Jeff Bezos has said he
supports a unified approach that simplifies tax col-
lection across the country.’’34 Of course, skeptics
argue that Amazon’s public statements are hypo-
critical and that the company’s true motives are to
maintain for as long as possible its tax advantage as
compared with competing retailers that must main-
tain a physical presence within major customer
27We provide an extended example in support of this point
infra.
28Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc., 386 U.S. at 759-60.
29Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting Freeman v. Hewit, 329
U.S. 249, 253 (1946)).
30Quill, 504 U.S. at 313 n.6; Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc., 386
U.S. at 760.
31For a discussion of the fair apportionment rule for direct
tax costs, see Gamage and Heckman, supra note 1.
32Quill, 504 U.S. at 314-316.
33Dale Kasler, ‘‘Amazon Takes on California Over Sales
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states.35 Nevertheless, Amazon’s public position
supports our argument that the only justifiable
reason for barring states from applying their use
taxes to remote vendors comes from the excess
compliance costs that could be generated by numer-
ous taxing jurisdictions imposing nonuniform com-
pliance obligations; even Amazon does not argue
that remote e-commerce vendors deserve a tax ad-
vantage as compared with their in-state competi-
tors.
Finally, that states have long been able to levy use
tax liabilities on their residents who purchase from
remote vendors is perhaps the strongest argument
in favor of interpreting Quill’s physical presence
requirement as applying only when the states im-
pose use tax compliance obligations on remote ven-
dors that might burden interstate commerce. In
most states, when individuals purchase e-commerce
goods for which the vendor did not remit sales or use
tax, they legally owe use taxes to their state of
residence.36 That state residents appear to be un-
aware of their use tax liabilities, and that compli-
ance is very low, does not change the fact that the
commerce clause has never been interpreted as
preventing states from making their individual resi-
dents liable for use taxes on purchases from remote
vendors.37 If the purpose of Quill’s physical presence
requirement was to shield remote vendors from the
economic incidence of state sales and use taxation,
then the commerce clause should also block states
from imposing use tax liabilities on their own resi-
dents for goods purchased from remote vendors.
The economic incidence of the tax burden gener-
ally remains the same even if the statutory inci-
dence changes; that is, the economic incidence is not
affected by whether a state resident is liable for a
use tax on purchases from remote vendors or
whether the remote vendors are liable for remitting
the use tax.38 In either case, the same amount of tax
is paid — raising the cost of the sales transaction
between the state resident and the remote vendor by
the same amount. The only major differences be-
tween these two approaches for taxing interstate
transactions are that (1) states find it much easier to
enforce compliance when vendors are required to
remit use taxes, compared with when individual
residents are required to remit the taxes; and (2)
requiring vendors to remit use taxes imposes report-
ing and compliance costs on those vendors, whereas
requiring individual residents to remit use taxes
imposes the reporting and compliance costs on the
individual residents. As no one has argued that
enforcement difficulties make a tax less constitu-
tionally suspect, only the second of those factors can
justify the commerce clause’s barring states from
imposing use tax compliance obligations on remote
vendors while allowing states to impose such obliga-
tions on the state’s individual residents. Again, the
only plausible way to reconcile Quill’s physical pres-
ence requirement with the Court’s other commerce
clause holdings is to view the physical presence
requirement as applying only when states impose
compliance costs on remote vendors in a manner
that burdens interstate commerce. Any other inter-
pretation of Quill would contradict the majority’s
claim that upholding the physical presence require-
ment is consistent with the Court’s other modern
commerce clause holdings.39
B. The Solution of Adequate Vendor
Compensation
If, as we have argued, the burden on interstate
commerce in Quill results from multistate vendors
potentially facing higher use tax compliance costs
compared with those of single-state vendors, a rem-
edy is available that would allow states to collect use
tax revenue from remote vendors without burdening
interstate commerce. We propose that Quill be in-
terpreted in such a way that states would be barred
from imposing use tax compliance burdens on re-
mote vendors only when the states fail to adequately
compensate the remote vendors for all those compli-
ance costs imposed.
Imagine two fictional states — Taxachusetts and
New Pork — each of which wants to levy a 10
percent sales and use tax. Each state’s tax regime
would impose compliance costs on vendors charged
with remitting the state’s tax. Those compliance
costs are unlikely to be directly proportional to the
amount of tax revenue collected, because there are
fixed costs associated with complying with a tax that
arise from the need to research the tax regime and
design systems to remit the tax.40 Imagine that a
35Id.; John Moe, ‘‘You May Soon Be Paying Sales Tax on




36Gamage and Heckman, supra note 1.
37Id.; see also Nina Manzi, Minnesota House of Repre-
sentatives Research Department, ‘‘Use Tax Collection on
Individual Income Tax Returns in Other States,’’ 3-4 (2010),
available at http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/use
tax.pdf.
38Jonathan Gruber, Public Finance and Public Policy, 521
(2004). There are exceptions to this rule — that is, circum-
stances that can lead to economic incidence varying with
statutory incidence. But those exceptions are not important
for our purposes here.
39Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 311 (1992).
40See Robert J. Cline and Thomas S. Neubig, Ernst &
Young LLP, ‘‘Masters of Complexity and Bearers of Great
Burden: The Sales Tax System and Compliance Costs for
Multistate Retailers,’’ at ii (1999), available at http://pla
za.ufl.edu/chriske2/masters.pdf (‘‘Small in-state retailers
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typical small vendor with total sales of $500,000
would bear compliance costs for each state’s tax it is
charged with remitting equal to fixed costs of $2,500
plus additional variable costs equal to 0.02 percent
of the amount sold into the state.41
A small vendor selling only to the residents of the
state in which the vendor resides would thus bear
compliance costs of $3,500 (the $2,500 of fixed costs
plus variable costs of $1,000 — or variable costs
equal to 0.02 percent of the $500,000 of sales). These
compliance costs would be in addition to the $50,000
of tax revenue that the vendor would be charged
with remitting (from the 10 percent tax rate). In
total, the state’s tax would thus impose a burden of
$53,500 on sales between the single-state vendor
and the state’s residents.
Now imagine that a vendor selling exclusively to
residents of Taxachusetts moves its operations to
New Pork, so that the vendor no longer has a
physical presence in Taxachusetts and conducts all
its sales through e-commerce. If Quill’s physical
presence rule exempts the vendor from Taxachu-
setts sales and use tax, the vendor would now have
a tax cost advantage over competitors that remain in
Taxachusetts. Using the numbers above, the vendor
would enjoy a tax cost advantage of $53,500 — or
10.7 percent of sales — from the combination of
avoiding both direct tax costs and tax compliance
costs due to moving to New Pork.
This example might suggest that the goal of
treating interstate commerce and intrastate com-
merce equally would require allowing Taxachusetts
to subject remote vendors to its sales and use tax
without compensating for compliance costs. But
imagine another small vendor residing in New Pork
that makes half of its sales ($250,000) to individual
residents of Taxachusetts and the other half to
individual residents of New Pork. If this vendor
were subject to the sales and use tax regimes of both
Taxachusetts and New Pork, the vendor would face
compliance costs from both tax regimes. In total, the
vendor would face compliance costs of $6,000 (the
vendor would be subject to the fixed costs of $2,500
twice, because of the need to comply with both
Taxachusetts’s and New Pork’s tax regimes, plus the
variable costs of 0.02 percent of the $500,000 of
aggregate sales). When combined with the direct tax
costs of $50,000 from the 10 percent tax rate levied
on sales into either state, the vendor’s sales would be
subject to an aggregate burden of $56,000.
In the absence of Quill’s physical presence rule,
the multistate vendor could thus face higher aggre-
gate costs than would a vendor operating solely
within a single state. That tax disadvantage results
from the fixed costs associated with complying with
each separate tax regime.42 In our example above,
the multistate vendor faced a tax disadvantage of
only $2,500 (from aggregate costs of $56,000, com-
pared with the single-state vendor’s aggregate costs
of $53,500). But our example above involved only
two taxing jurisdictions. With 50 states and several
thousand local taxing jurisdictions, a multistate
vendor might well face a significant disadvantage
from aggregate use tax compliance costs in the
absence of Quill’s physical presence rule or an
equivalent protection.43
In the extreme, imagine if the $2,500 of additional
tax burden resulting from the fixed costs of comply-
ing with each jurisdiction’s separate use tax was
multiplied by several thousand separate taxing ju-
risdictions. Although it is unlikely that real-world
tax compliance burdens would ever reach these
levels,44 we should be wary of even the theoretical
possibility of a multistate vendor with sales of only
$500,000 facing use tax compliance costs in the
range of several millions of dollars.45 Even if bur-
dens reached only a small fraction of that level, use
tax compliance costs could still significantly burden
interstate commerce.
($250,000 of annual taxable sales in Washington) bear unac-
ceptably high compliance costs — 7 percent of sales taxes
collected — that put them at a competitive disadvantage to
larger firms in the state. This high level of compliance costs
suggests that, for smaller firms, the sales tax may be reaching
the point where it cannot be collected at a reasonable cost.
Medium ($750,000 of sales) and large retailers ($10 million in
sales) have lower compliance cost burdens because fixed
compliance costs are spread over larger sales tax collections
and they generally use automated collection and reporting
systems. The compliance cost for the medium-size retailer is
still very high at almost 4 percent of sales taxes collected, or
one-quarter of its profits’’).
41The numbers in these examples are roughly extrapo-
lated from Cline and Neubig’s study of compliance costs. Id.
These costs, however, might be somewhat lower today than
they were in 1999.
42See, e.g., Cara Griffith, ‘‘Streamlining Versus ‘Amazon’
Laws: The Remote Seller Dilemma,’’ State Tax Notes, Feb. 1,
2010, p. 351, Doc 2010-1816, or 2010 STT 20-6. (‘‘Determining
how to handle tax-exempt sales, sales tax holidays, and
product taxability coding can be a daunting task, particularly
for small and midsize businesses. It has been estimated that
sales tax exemptions account for 60 percent of the cost of
compliance for small businesses.’’)
43That disadvantage would burden small and medium-size
vendors far more than it would large vendors, and the
disadvantage could be alleviated to some extent by exempting
small vendors from use taxation. But the burden does not
completely disappear for large vendors, and even the burden
facing large vendors could be significant if thousands of
taxing jurisdictions are allowed to impose different use tax
regimes and the differences in these regimes are sufficiently
complicated.
44If compliance burdens began to reach extremely high
levels, there would likely be significant political pressure to
simplify and unify use tax regimes.
45An aggregate use tax compliance burden in the millions
of dollars could result only if the vendor sold into numerous
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We thus have a dilemma in developing a com-
merce clause rule for state taxation of transactions
between the state’s residents and remote vendors.
Exempting remote vendors from state sales and use
taxation grants those vendors a significant tax ad-
vantage, which is not the purpose of the commerce
clause. But allowing states to impose the same
compliance burdens on remote vendors as they do on
in-state vendors could impose a substantial tax cost
disadvantage on remote vendors, which could in
turn burden interstate commerce. And if a state
attempted to chart a middle course by imposing
compliance burdens on larger remote vendors while
exempting smaller remote vendors, this approach
would provide the smaller remote vendors with an
unjustified tax advantage compared with both
larger remote vendors and in-state vendors of all
sizes.
Fortunately, a better middle course is available.
Because the burden on interstate commerce that
justifies Quill’s physical presence rule results from
tax compliance costs, rather than from the direct
costs of taxation, the burden can be alleviated by
permitting states to impose use tax compliance
obligations on remote vendors if and only if the
states adequately compensate the remote vendors
for all such compliance costs imposed. Returning to
our example above in which a vendor residing in
New Pork sold to both Taxachusetts and New Pork
residents, imagine that Taxachusetts levied its use
tax on the vendor while compensating for the tax
compliance costs thereby imposed. The vendor
would bear $6,000 in gross compliance costs (the
vendor would still be subject to the fixed costs of
$2,500 twice, because of the need to comply with
both Taxachusetts’s and New Pork’s tax regimes,
plus the variable costs of 0.02 percent of $500,000).
But Taxachusetts would then reimburse the vendor
for $3,000 of those compliance costs (the $2,500 fixed
costs of complying with Taxachusetts’s use tax, plus
the variable costs of 0.02 percent of the $250,000 of
sales made to Taxachusetts’s residents). The vendor
would thus face net compliance costs of only $3,000
after the reimbursement. When combined with the
direct tax costs of $50,000 from the 10 percent tax
rate levied on sales into either state, the vendor’s
sales would be subject to an aggregate burden of
$53,000.
Consequently, permitting states to impose use tax
compliance obligations on remote vendors only when
the states adequately compensate the remote ven-
dors for those costs would alleviate the burden on
interstate commerce. Indeed, our proposal of ad-
equate vendor compensation would likely result in
remote vendors’ maintaining a small tax cost advan-
tage compared with in-state vendors.46 In our nu-
merical examples, the multistate vendor would face
costs of $53,000 compared with the in-state vendor’s
costs of $53,500. The reason for this tax cost advan-
tage is that our examples require the states to
compensate for the variable costs of use tax compli-
ance in addition to the fixed costs. We suspect that it
would prove administratively impractical to require
states to compensate only for fixed costs, because
there is no simple and straightforward mechanism
for perfectly distinguishing between direct and indi-
rect costs. Nevertheless, our proposal would still
level the playing field considerably compared with
completely exempting remote vendors from use
taxation.47
Moreover, our proposal would allow states to
collect most of the potential revenue available from
taxing e-commerce transactions with out-of-state
vendors. In our example above, Taxachusetts would
raise $25,000 of revenue by levying its 10 percent
sales and use tax rate on the $250,000 of sales the
remote vendor makes to Taxachusetts residents. As
compensation for the compliance costs imposed by
subjecting the remote vendor to its use tax, Taxa-
chusetts would need to compensate the remote ven-
dor only $3,000, thus producing a net revenue gain
of $22,000 for Taxachusetts. This $22,000 gain
amounts to 88 percent of the revenue that could
have been raised from imposing the use tax on the
remote vendor without compensating for compliance
costs.
More generally, use tax compliance costs are
estimated to be about 1 to 3 percent of tax revenue,
with the costs being much higher as a percentage of
taxing jurisdictions, and some of those jurisdictions might be
prevented from levying use taxes on the vendor because of the
minimum contacts requirement of the due process clause,
even if the jurisdictions were not prevented from imposing
burdens due to the commerce clause. Nevertheless, although
the example of a vendor making $500,000 in total sales being
subject to millions of dollars in aggregate use tax compliance
costs is unrealistically extreme, it still illustrates the general
result whereby a multistate vendor could face a significant
tax disadvantage from being subject to multiple use tax
compliance regimes in the absence of a compensation require-
ment or some other protection for the vendor.
46This advantage results because we propose that states
implement vendor compensation so as to ensure that remote
vendors are fully and adequately compensated; in order for
states to meet their constitutional obligations, we suggest
that states are in the direction of overcompensating remote
vendors. Were states able to compensate only for the incre-
mental compliance costs that a remote vendor incurs from
doing business in the state, then states could avoid either
overcompensating or undercompensating remote vendors
such that neither remote vendors nor in-state vendors would
enjoy any tax cost advantages.
47And a state wanting to level the playing field would need
only to compensate in-state vendors for compliance costs in
addition to compensating remote vendors.
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sales for small vendors than for large vendors.48
Hence, requiring states to compensate for compli-
ance costs should result in the states being able to
raise nearly all the revenue available from taxing
e-commerce, while still avoiding burdening inter-
state commerce. If the requirement that states com-
pensate remote vendors for compliance costs pro-
vides incentives for the states to simplify and unify
their use tax regimes, the revenue loss from com-
pensating remote vendors could end up being an
even smaller percentage of the revenue states could
raise without vendor compensation.
If a jurisdiction exempts from its
use tax vendors whose sales into
the jurisdiction fall below some
minimal threshold amount, the
jurisdiction can ensure that vendor
compensation results in only small
revenue loss.
Some small states and taxing jurisdictions might
find that compensating vendors for compliance costs
could result in significant revenue loss, but only if
the jurisdictions impose complicated use tax compli-
ance obligations on vendors that sell only minimal
amounts into the jurisdictions. If a jurisdiction ex-
empts from its use tax vendors whose sales into the
jurisdiction fall below some minimal threshold
amount, the jurisdiction can ensure that vendor
compensation results in only small revenue loss. In
any case, requiring adequate vendor compensation
results in the states and jurisdictions bearing the
costs when compliance burdens are imposed on
small vendors. Requiring vendor compensation
would protect small vendors from bearing those
costs, and taxing jurisdictions would have incentives
to impose use tax compliance obligations only to the
extent that the potential revenue gain sufficiently
exceeds the resulting compliance costs.
In sum, permitting the states to impose use tax
compliance burdens on remote vendors, if and only if
the states adequately compensate for all compliance
costs thereby imposed, would effectively navigate
between the harms that result either from com-
pletely blocking the states from taxing remote ven-
dors or from allowing the states to tax remote
vendors without restriction. As compared with a rule
completely exempting remote vendors from sales
and use taxation, our proposal would level the
playing field between remote vendors and their
in-state competitors considerably. No longer would
remote vendors have an advantage over their in-
state competitors by being shielded from both direct
tax costs and compliance costs. Instead, they would
enjoy only the much smaller advantage of being
compensated for compliance costs. Plus, the states
would mostly be protected from the revenue loss
that currently results from their inability to tax
e-commerce transactions between their residents
and remote vendors.
Conversely, as compared with overturning Quill
and allowing the states unrestricted ability to tax
e-commerce transactions with remote vendors, our
proposaleliminatesanypotential forburdening inter-
state commerce. Because remote vendors would be
more than compensated for any excess compliance
costs from being subject to multiple jurisdictions’
use taxes, remote vendors would never face a tax
disadvantage as compared with in-state vendors.
Moreover, the states would have incentives to sim-
plify and unify their use tax regimes and would be
prevented from using complicated use tax compli-
ance obligations as a backdoor form of protection-
ism. Consequently, our proposal of adequate vendor
compensation would alleviate nearly all the harms
that result from the previous, strict interpretation of
Quill’s physical presence rule and would do so with-
out creating any potential for burdening interstate
commerce.
C. Implementing Our Proposal for Adequate
Vendor Compensation
The implementation mechanics of our proposal
are not without precedent. Twenty-eight states com-
pensate vendors to some degree for the costs of
complying with sales and use taxes in some con-
texts.49 For instance, Utah passed a law in 2006 that
reimbursed some vendors for some of their costs
from complying with a reduced sales and use tax
rate imposed on food and food ingredients.50 The law
reimbursed vendors that remitted between $15,000
48PricewaterhouseCoopers, ‘‘Retail Sales Tax Compliance
Costs: A National Estimate, Volume One: Maine Report,’’ at
E-1 (2006), available at http://www.bacssuta.org/Cost%20of%
20Collection%20Study%20-%20SSTP.pdf; Washington State
Department of Revenue, ‘‘Retailers’ Cost of Collecting and
Remitting Sales Tax’’ 4 (1998), available at http://dor.wa.gov/
content/aboutus/statisticsandreports/retailers_cost_study/def
ault.aspx.
49Cline and Neubig, supra note 40, at 22 (recognizing that
27 states offered vendor discounts in 1999; that number
increased to 28 states after Wyoming recently initiated a
vendor compensation system); Tripp Baltz, ‘‘Wyoming Gover-
nor Signs Bill Providing Vendor Compensation for State Sales
Tax,’’ BNA Tax Mgmt. Wkly. St. Tax Rep., Mar. 18, 2011 (on
file with authors); see also Philip Mattera with Leigh McIl-
vaine, ‘‘Skimming the Sales Tax: How Wal-Mart and Other
Big Retailers (Legally) Keep a Cut of the Taxes We Pay on
Everyday Purchases’’ (2008), available at http://www.good
jobsfirst.org/sites/default/files/docs/pdf/skimming.pdf.
50Sales and Use Tax Relating to Food section 3, 2006 Utah
Laws 2023-2024.
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and $500,000 in sales or use taxes for their ‘‘verifi-
able amounts . . . actually expended . . . to purchase
computer hardware, software, or programming to
account for sales under the reduced sales and use
tax.’’51
As an alternative to Utah’s approach of compen-
sation, some states allow vendors to keep a specified
portion of the sales and use taxes they collect as
compensation for the compliance costs of remitting
the remainder to the state. For instance, Wyoming
passed a law in 2011 ‘‘allowing retailers and other
vendors to take up to a 1.95 percent discount from
the sales taxes they collect and remit to the state.’’52
Wyoming’s approach of using specified percentages
thus achieves greater administrability at the ex-
pense of being less finely tuned in measuring actual
compliance costs. Another similar example of a
mechanism for reimbursing vendors’ compliance
costs was the proposed administration and compli-
ance equipment cost credit in the failed National
Retail Sales Tax Act of 1996, which would have
allowed vendors to withhold a percentage of taxes
due to be remitted as compensation for specified
compliance-related expenses.53
We suggest that states use a combination of those
two approaches to ensure that they adequately com-
pensate remote vendors for all compliance costs. As
a default, and without need to show verification,
vendors should be allowed to opt to keep a specified
percentage of the use tax amounts they collect from
transactions with a state’s residents. The percent-
age of use tax collections that a vendor should be
allowed to keep could be set based on the size of the
vendor or other easily demonstrable characteristics
of the vendor. Regardless, the percentage amount
should be set significantly higher than the state’s
estimate for the average collection costs imposed on
the category of vendors. Also, vendors should be
allowed to demonstrate that their actual verifiable
compliance costs exceed the percentage allowed.
Vendors whose actual verifiable compliance costs
exceed the allowed percentage should be permitted
to keep a portion of the use tax revenue collected
equal to the vendor’s actual verifiable compliance
costs plus the costs incurred in reporting and dem-
onstrating those compliance costs. Finally, if the
compliance costs for any vendor exceed the amount
of use tax revenue the vendor collects from transac-
tions with individual residents in a state or local
taxing jurisdiction, the state or local jurisdiction
should establish a process for the vendor to apply for
reimbursement for those costs.54
Importantly, compensation for compliance costs
must include compensation for intangible costs such
as executives’ time and the risk of being subject to
penalties for inadvertent noncompliance.55 The de-
fault compensation rates should be set based on
outside experts’ estimates for aggregate compliance
costs, including both tangible and intangible costs.
Remote vendors that want to demonstrate that their
actual compliance costs exceed the default amounts
should be permitted to submit expert testimony
substantiating the vendor’s tangible and intangible
compliance costs. And the states should also com-
pensate remote vendors for amounts expended to
document their compliance costs and to dispute the
amounts of the compliance costs with the states.
The states should prefer to
overcompensate vendors while
levying use taxes rather than to be
blocked from levying use taxes
altogether.
As a matter of policy, it might arguably be exces-
sive to compensate for all intangible compliance
costs of this sort. Were Congress to pass legislation
enabling the states to tax remote vendors as long as
the states adequately compensated for all compli-
ance costs, we might favor a less strict compensation
regime. But to comply with the Quill framework, the
states must create procedures so that vendors can
expect to be fully and adequately compensated for
51Id. section 3(4)-(5).
52Baltz, supra note 49.
53H.R. 3039, 104th Cong. section 11(f) (1996).
54This condition is necessary to ensure that small taxing
jurisdictions do not impose excess compliance costs on remote
vendors.
55It is impossible to reimburse vendors for the actual
penalties imposed for noncompliance (inadvertent or other-
wise), but it is possible to reimburse them for the risk
premium created by the possibility of being subject to sanc-
tions for inadvertent noncompliance. A properly designed
vendor compensation system should be able to compensate
vendors fully and adequately for all the expected costs created
by imposing use tax compliance obligations on remote ven-
dors, and this should satisfy the standard of not imposing any
burden on interstate e-commerce. Even if some small number
of remote vendor firms ended up bearing larger sanctions
from inadvertent noncompliance than the allowed reimburse-
ment amounts, that would not burden interstate commerce as
long as remote vendors could anticipate receiving reimburse-
ment amounts equal to or greater than the aggregate of all
their expected costs — that is, compensation amounts would
be full and adequate in expectation. We thank Mark Gergen
and Andy Haile for their helpful comments on this point.
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all compliance costs, both tangible and intangible.
Those procedures will likely result in many vendors
being overcompensated. Nevertheless, the states
should prefer to overcompensate vendors while levy-
ing use taxes rather than to be blocked from levying
use taxes altogether.
According to a 1998 study by the Research Divi-
sion of the Washington State Department of Rev-
enue, vendors’ total costs of collecting and remitting
Washington’s state and local sales taxes amounted
to 6.47 percent of tax collections for small vendors,
3.35 percent of tax collections for medium-size ven-
dors, and 0.97 percent tax collections for large ven-
dors, for a total weighted average of 1.42 percent of
total revenue across all vendors.56 According to
another study by PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP in
2006, the national average for annual sales tax
compliance costs amounted to 3.09 percent of total
tax collections in 2003, with small retailers’ costs
amounting to 13.47 percent of tax collections,
medium-size retailers’ costs amounting to 5.2 per-
cent of tax collections, and large retailers’ costs
amounting to 2.17 percent of tax collections.57
Hence, a jurisdiction might set the default com-
pensation rates at 15 percent of tax collections for
small vendors, 7 percent of tax collections for
medium-size vendors, and 3 percent of tax collec-
tions for large vendors. Those generous compensa-
tion rates should exceed actual compliance costs for
almost all vendors. Indeed, a jurisdiction wanting to
be more aggressive might opt to set the compensa-
tion rates well below those levels. In any case,
vendors would have to be allowed to demonstrate
that their actual compliance burdens exceeded the
default percentages. Again, a vendor should be al-
lowed to keep as compensation a percentage of the
use tax revenue collected equal to the greater of the
amounts calculated using the relevant default com-
pensation percentage or the amount the vendor
verifiably demonstrates as the vendor’s actual com-
pliance costs.
Our proposal in this section is intended as an
example of a mechanism for ensuring full and ad-
equate vendor compensation. Other approaches to
vendor compensation are certainly possible. For
instance, on policy grounds it might arguably be
preferable for a state to compensate only for the
estimated incremental compliance costs generated
by doing business in the state.58 Our proposed
approach is designed to minimize constitutional
tensions, even at the expense of overcompensating
many remote vendors from a policy perspective.
D. Overcoming Stare Decisis and Quill’s
Bright-Line Rule
There are two major justifications for Quill’s
physical presence rule.59 So far we have focused on
analyzing the first justification — the potential
burden on interstate commerce that could result
from excess tax compliance costs. The second justi-
fication is based on stare decisis. Because the physi-
cal presence rule had previously been adopted by the
Bellas Hess decision, the Quill majority concluded
that ‘‘the ‘interest in stability and orderly develop-
ment of the law’ that undergirds the doctrine of stare
decisis . . . counsel[ed] adherence to settled pre-
cedent.’’60
The Quill decision articulated the physical pres-
ence rule as a bright-line test.61 As Rosen and
Hedstrom explained, ‘‘Under Quill, an assessment of
the actual burdens is not required; physical pres-
ence is a bright-line rule and the law of the land.’’62
Even a small potential burden on interstate com-
merce thus suffices to prevent states from imposing
use tax compliance obligations on remote vendors
that lack physical presence within the state. Al-
though the Quill decision acknowledged that the
physical presence rule, ‘‘like other bright-line test-
s[,] . . . appears artificial at its edges,’’63 the Quill
majority nonetheless concluded that ‘‘this artificiali-
ty . . . is more than offset by the benefits of a clear
rule.’’64 By adopting the clear, bright-line physical
presence rule, the Quill majority hoped to reduce
litigation and to avoid the ‘‘quagmire’’ and ‘‘confu-
sion’’ that might otherwise arise in the absence of
‘‘precise guides to the States in the exercise of their
indispensable power of taxation.’’65
Nevertheless, although Quill’s physical presence
rule applies even when the potential burden on
interstate commerce is small, the physical presence
rule should not prevent state action unless that
action has some actual potential for burdening inter-
state commerce. The Quill majority adopted the
physical presence rule in order to avoid the potential
confusion and quagmire that could result from a
balancing test.66 It would be difficult to balance
56Washington State Department of Revenue, supra note
48, at 4.
57PricewaterhouseCoopers, supra note 48, at E-1.
58We thank Eric Rakowski and Susie Morse for their
helpful suggestions on this point.
59For a discussion of the two major justifications, see
Edward A. Zelinsky, ‘‘The Siren Song of ‘Amazon’ Laws: The
Colorado Example,’’ State Tax Notes, Mar. 7, 2011, p. 695, Doc
2011-3777, or 2011 STT 44-2; and Gamage and Heckman,
supra note 1.
60Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 317 (1992)
(quoting Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 190-191 (1976)
(Stevens, J., concurring)).
61Id. at 314.
62Rosen and Hedstrom, supra note 10, at 931.
63Quill, 504 U.S. at 315.
64Id.
65Id. at 315-316 (quoting Nw. States Portland Cement Co.
v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 457-458 (1959)).
66Id. at 314-16.
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potential harms to interstate commerce against the
states’ valid interest in levying an appropriate
amount of revenue from transactions between the
states’ residents and remote vendors; that compari-
son would be like comparing apples with aardvarks,
because there is no common metric for evaluating
the two competing concerns. But in the absence of
any potential burden on interstate commerce, that
balancing act becomes simple. When there is zero
weight placed on one side of a scale, any amount of
weight on the other side of the scale makes the scale
tip in that direction, even if the amount of that
weight is indeterminable.
Zero potential burden is thus different in kind
from small potential burden. Both balancing tests
and bright-line tests are designed to weigh compet-
ing burdens. Neither test is appropriate when evalu-
ating state action that has zero potential for burden-
ing interstate commerce. Before any commerce
clause test should be applied, the threshold condi-
tion must be met that there be some potential for the
state action to actually burden interstate commerce.
Before any commerce clause test
should be applied, the threshold
condition must be met that there
be some potential for the state
action to actually burden interstate
commerce.
Some commentators have attempted to justify
Quill’s physical presence rule apart from any poten-
tial burden on interstate commerce.67 Those argu-
ments might have validity based only on Bellas
Hess, as the Bellas Hess decision was unclear re-
garding whether the physical presence requirement
was justified by the commerce clause, the due proc-
ess clause, or both.68 But Quill clarified that the due
process clause does not prevent states from impos-
ing use tax compliance obligations on remote ven-
dors as long as the remote vendors conduct some
threshold level of sales within the state.69 Only the
commerce clause prevents states from imposing use
tax compliance obligations on the major e-commerce
vendors. And Quill repeatedly clarified that the
nexus requirement of the commerce clause is not
about ‘‘fairness for the individual defendant’’70 but
rather is justified as ‘‘a means for limiting state
burdens on interstate commerce.’’71 In the absence of
any potential for burdens on interstate commerce,
the physical presence rule should not apply.
In other words, we argue that imposing use tax
compliance burdens while adequately compensating
remote vendors for all compliance costs is substan-
tially different regarding the commerce clause from
imposing use tax compliance burdens on remote
vendors without adequately compensating for com-
pliance costs. Although the Quill Court never dis-
cusses whether its holding would apply were states
to adequately compensate for compliance costs, the
logic of Quill suggests that the physical presence
rule should not block states from imposing use tax
compliance burdens when they adequately compen-
sate remote vendors for all compliance costs. Stare
decisis does not justify extending a holding to fact
patterns that substantially differ from the facts on
which the original holding was based.
Although many states have established systems
for compensating some vendors for compliance costs
to at least some degree, existing compensation levels
are ‘‘relatively small compared to the estimated
retailer’s costs of collecting sales and use taxes.’’72 To
our knowledge, no state or local taxing jurisdiction
has ever fully compensated vendors for their compli-
ance costs.73 Hence, that some states implemented
partial vendor compensation schemes prior to the
Quill decision does not imply that the Quill majority
considered and rejected the possibility that a full
and adequate vendor compensation system could
enable the states to impose use tax compliance
obligations without burdening interstate commerce.
Only by fully and adequately compensating remote
vendors for all use tax compliance costs can a state
impose use tax compliance burdens on remote ven-
dors without creating any potential for burdening
interstate commerce — thus satisfying Quill.
If there is no potential burden on
interstate commerce, the physical
presence rule should not apply.
Along these lines, it is worth noting that the
North Dakota statute evaluated by Quill contained
a provision for partial vendor compensation.74 That
provision was not discussed by any of the U.S.
Supreme Court opinions, but the North Dakota
Supreme Court noted that the vendor compensation
provision served to ‘‘alleviate[] any burdens created
67E.g., Rosen and Hedstrom, supra note 10, at 932.
68See Quill, 504 U.S. at 305. (‘‘Although we have not
always been precise in distinguishing between the two, the
Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause are analyti-
cally distinct.’’)
69Gamage and Heckman, supra note 1.
70Quill, 504 U.S. at 312.
71Id. at 313.
72Cline and Neubig, supra note 40, at 22.
73See id. (discussing existing compensation regimes).
74We thank Kirk Stark for bringing this to our attention
and for his helpful comments on this point.
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by requiring Quill to collect and remit the tax.’’75
Because the vendor compensation provision was
inadequate, however, the provision did not eliminate
the North Dakota Supreme Court’s concern that
allowing states to impose collection costs on remote
vendors could burden interstate commerce through
excess tax collection costs.76 Unlike our proposal for
full and adequate vendor compensation, to merely
‘‘alleviate’’ burdens on remote vendors does not suf-
fice to prevent the potential for burdening interstate
commerce. That the U.S. Supreme Court did not
discuss the partial vendor compensation provision in
the North Dakota statute thus provides no indica-
tion as to the constitutionality of a full and adequate
system of vendor compensation.77 There is no sug-
gestion in Quill or in any of the related cases that
any court considered the possibility that a state
might devise a system for fully and adequately
compensating remote vendors.
Somewhat relatedly, a number of commentators
have suggested that the Quill majority was partially
motivated by the concern that state use taxes would
be applied retroactively to remote vendors if the
Court fully overturned Bellas Hess.78 As the Quill
majority explained, ‘‘An overruling of Bellas Hess
might raise thorny questions concerning the retro-
active application of those taxes and might trigger
substantial unanticipated liability for mail-order
houses.’’79 At least one witness to the Quill oral
argument thought that the justices were ‘‘very con-
cerned about retroactivity’’ and that the retroactiv-
ity issue might have ‘‘tip[ped] the case against the
states.’’80 The Quill majority may have even been
thinking of the retroactivity issue when they wrote
that ‘‘a bright-line rule in the area of sales and use
taxes . . . encourages settled expectations and, in
doing so, fosters investment by businesses and indi-
viduals.’’81 Regardless, because the states do not
now reimburse vendors for all use tax compliance
costs, there would be no retroactivity concern in a
court ruling that states can impose use tax compli-
ance obligations on remote vendors, if and only if the
states adequately compensate for all tax compliance
costs thereby imposed.
We do not mean to suggest that states could
impose use tax compliance burdens on remote ven-
dors with no fear of those burdens being held uncon-
stitutional as long as the states adequately compen-
sate the vendors for all compliance costs. There
remains uncertainty as to how courts would respond
to our proposal. We have argued that both the
language and the logic of the Quill decision strongly
imply that states should be permitted to impose use
tax compliance obligations as long as they ad-
equately compensate remote vendors so as to re-
move any potential for burdening interstate com-
merce. But formalist judges might still hold that
Quill’s physical presence rule applies even to our
proposal.
Remember, however, that the Court has repeat-
edly cautioned against formalism in its commerce
clause holdings.82 The Court has emphasized that
its commerce clause jurisprudence is grounded in
‘‘pragmatism,’’83 ‘‘economic realities,’’84 and ‘‘practi-
cal effect[s],’’85 and is disdainful of ‘‘formalism,’’86
‘‘magic words,’’87 and ‘‘labels.’’88 Lower courts should
thus have difficulty justifying the extension of
Quill’s physical presence test to circumstances in
which there is no potential for burdening interstate
commerce. That extension could only be justified on
formalistic grounds, and extending the physical
presence rule to apply even when there is no poten-
tial for burdening interstate commerce would thus
directly contradict the Court’s pronouncements
about the purposes of the commerce clause.
We take Quill seriously in its statements that the
purpose of the physical presence rule is to prevent
burdens on interstate commerce,89 that the potential
burden on interstate commerce arises from excess
compliance costs,90 and that the commerce clause
should be applied based on economic realities and
75State v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 203, 215 (N.D. 1991).
76See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 313 n.6
(1992).
77The statutes evaluated in some of the earlier cases, such
as the statute at issue in Bellas Hess, also contained partial
vendor compensation provisions. E.g., Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc.
v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 764 n.7 (1967) (Fortas,
J., dissenting). Those provisions are irrelevant to our discus-
sion because there is no indication that the statutes offered
full and adequate vendor compensation and because Bellas
Hess and the other earlier cases concerned the due process
clause in addition to the commerce clause. We do not argue
that full and adequate vendor compensation would resolve
potential due process clause violations, but Quill held that
states can impose compliance burdens on remote vendors
without violating the due process clause.
78E.g., Rosen and Hedstrom, supra note 10, at 935-936;
Charles Rothfield, ‘‘Quill: Confusing the Commerce Clause,’’
State Tax Notes, July 27, 1992, p. 111 and n.47.
79Quill, 504 U.S. at 318 n.10.
80Billy Hamilton, ‘‘Remembrance of Things Not So Past:
The Story Behind the Quill Decision,’’ State Tax Notes, Mar.
14, 2011, p. 807, Doc 2011-4390, or 2011 STT 49-4.
81Quill, 504 U.S. at 316.
82John A. Swain, ‘‘Cybertaxation and the Commerce
Clause: Entity Isolation or Affiliate Nexus?’’ 75 S. Cal. L. Rev.
419, 427 (2002).
83D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24, 30 (1988).
84Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279
(1977).
85Id. at 279.
86Quill, 504 U.S. at 310.
87Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279.
88Id.
89Quill, 504 U.S. at 313.
90Id. at 313 n.6.
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practical effects rather than formalistically.91 It con-
sequently seems clear to us that Quill’s physical
presence rule should not apply when a state ad-
equately compensates remote vendors for all compli-
ance costs and thereby alleviates any possibility of
burdening interstate commerce. Although we cannot
guarantee that courts will agree with our analysis,
we think that the arguments supporting the consti-
tutionality of our proposed approach are more than
persuasive enough to make our approach the best
way forward for states that wish to raise revenue by
taxing interstate e-commerce.
III. Implications for States, Courts,
and Congress
A. Implications for the States
We propose that the states adopt our approach of
requiring remote vendors to remit use taxes while
compensating the remote vendors for all tax compli-
ance costs thereby imposed. Our approach should be
especially attractive to the states that are contem-
plating Amazon laws. We have argued that the
current strategies underlying the states’ Amazon
laws will be ineffective, are likely to be held uncon-
stitutional, or both.92 In contrast, we have argued
that our approach should be both effective and
constitutional.
Granted, to the extent the states can actually
reach remote vendors with the existing Amazon law
strategies, our approach might generate slightly less
revenue because of the need to compensate for
compliance costs. But even if the need to compensate
for compliance costs reduces the revenue-generating
potential of our approach, that disadvantage should
be more than offset because our approach would not
give e-commerce vendors incentives to move their
operations out of state.93
Moreover, our proposed approach could be com-
bined with the other Amazon law strategies. By
combining our vendor-compensation approach with
the referrer-nexus or related-entity-nexus strate-
gies, a state could impose use tax compliance obli-
gations on all e-commerce vendors that conduct
more than some minimal amount of business with
in-state residents. To the extent the courts deter-
mine that remote vendors can be imputed to have
physical presence based on the referrer-nexus or
related-entity-nexus principles, the states would not
need to compensate the remote vendors for tax
compliance costs. Also, our approach would allow the
states to impose use tax compliance obligations on
remote vendors that the courts determine to lack
physical presence, as long as the states compensate
those remote vendors for all tax compliance costs.
By using our approach as a backstop to other
strategies, the states could thus greatly reduce re-
mote vendors’ incentives to move their operations
out of state. The most remote vendors could gain
from reorganizing their operations would be com-
pensation for tax compliance costs, which is much
less lucrative for the remote vendors than the pos-
sibility of being completely exempt from both direct
tax costs and tax compliance costs.
By using our approach as a
backstop to other strategies, the
states could thus greatly reduce
remote vendors’ incentives to
move their operations out of state.
Similarly, by combining our approach with the
information reporting requirements strategy, states
could greatly improve the likelihood of the informa-
tion reporting requirements being held constitu-
tional. We expect other courts to follow the lead of
the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado in
determining that information reporting require-
ments violate the commerce clause, at least when
not combined with adequate vendor compensation.
But we conclude that all commerce clause concerns
would be completely alleviated were a state to im-
pose information reporting requirements while ad-
equately compensating remote vendors for all the
compliance costs they thereby incur.
Furthermore, we suggest that even states not
contemplating Amazon laws adopt our approach.
Because our approach eliminates any potential for
burdening interstate commerce while generating
revenue for the states, there is no reason for the
states to continue offering remote e-commerce ven-
dors a tax cost advantage over in-state competitors.
To level the playing field, every state that levies a
sales tax should adopt our approach so that in-state
consumers can decide whether to purchase from
in-state vendors or from remote e-commerce vendors
based on market factors rather than on differential
tax treatment.94 States that do not want to raise
91Id. at 310.
92Gamage and Heckman, supra note 1.
93See, e.g., Eric Anderson, Nathan Fong, Duncan Simester,
and Catherine Tucker, ‘‘How Sales Taxes Affect Customer and
Firm Behavior: The Role of Search on the Internet,’’ 47 J.
Marketing Res. 229, 230 (2010) (‘‘We find that retailers that
conduct most of their business through direct channels avoid
opening a first store in high-tax states. We conclude that
these retailers appear to be forward-looking, anticipating the
growth of the Internet channel and avoiding the potential risk
to this future revenue stream’’).
94See John A. Swain, ‘‘State Sales and Use Tax Jurisdic-
tion: An Economic Nexus Standard for the Twenty-First
Century,’’ 38 Ga. L. Rev. 343, 345 (2003) (arguing that from ‘‘a
normative tax policy perspective,’’ all consumer purchases
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additional tax revenue could use the revenue gener-
ated by adopting our approach to reduce the general
sales tax rate affecting all vendors.
By combining our approach with
the information reporting
requirements strategy, states
could greatly improve the
likelihood of the information
reporting requirements being held
constitutional.
Finally, our approach is fully compatible with
multistate efforts to simplify and unify sales and use
taxation. Indeed, our approach would give the states
an incentive to reduce compliance costs to the extent
possible, as the states, rather than remote vendors,
would bear those costs. We applaud current multi-
state efforts to simplify and unify sales and use tax
administration — such as the Streamlined Sales
and Use Tax Agreement.95 However, we also recog-
nize that there may be valid reasons why states may
want to avoid completely unifying their sales and
use taxes.96 For example, centralization potentially
interferes with the states’ customizing their tax laws
to meet local needs and with their experimenting
with new approaches so as to foster a laboratory of
democracy.97 Our approach balances the competing
goals of unification and of maintaining local discre-
tion by causing states to internalize the costs of
complexity and non-unification. Except when local
needs overpower the cost-saving advantages of uni-
fying a state’s sales and use tax laws with those of
the other states, our approach should lead the states
to pursue simplification and unification based on
their own self-interest in minimizing the costs of
compensating remote vendors.
C. Implications for the Courts
The primary implication of our analysis is that
the courts should bless state attempts to place use
tax compliance obligations on remote vendors as
long as the states compensate the remote vendors
for all tax compliance costs thereby imposed. If
states adopt our approach, the courts should uphold
those states’ laws against any commerce clause
challenges. Furthermore, we would advise the
courts reviewing commerce clause challenges to the
existing state Amazon laws to note that our ap-
proach is available as a more constitutionally sound
(and effective) alternative.
Indeed, realizing that our approach is available
should make the courts more comfortable in ruling
that the existing Amazon law strategies violate the
commerce clause. We take no stance on how the
courts should actually rule on evaluating the
referrer-nexus or related-entity-nexus strategies.98
But judges uncertain about the constitutionality of
those strategies might appropriately be influenced
by our proposal’s being available as a superior
alternative.
If the Supreme Court accepts a case challenging
any of the existing Amazon laws, many scholars
hope that it will overturn Quill.99 Even with our
proposed approach available as a means for states to
tax remote e-commerce vendors, those scholars
might still argue that the physical presence rule
grants remote e-commerce vendors an unjustified
advantage over multistate retailers that have to
maintain a physical presence within their customer
states.100 If subject to use taxation, both a multistate
retailer with physical presence and a multistate
e-commerce retailer without physical presence
would bear tax compliance costs. Yet our proposal
would require states to reimburse only the multi-
state e-commerce vendor for those costs.
A good case can be made that the states should
also provide adequate vendor compensation for multi-
state retailers that maintain a physical presence
‘‘should be taxed to avoid discrimination’’ and to ‘‘keep a level
playing field,’’ and that ‘‘it is more administratively practical
to collect the tax from the seller’’).
95For a discussion of those efforts, we recommend Brian
Galle, ‘‘Designing Interstate Institutions: The Example of
SSUTA,’’ 40 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1381 (2007); Frank Shafroth,
‘‘Has the SSTP Become Overburdened?’’ State Tax Notes, Feb.
1, 2010, p. 355, Doc 2010-761, or 2010 STT 20-4; and John
Swain and Walter Hellerstein, ‘‘The Political Economy of the
Streamlined Sales Tax Agreement,’’ 58 Nat’l Tax J. 605
(2005).
96See, e.g., Robert D. Plattner, Daniel Smirlock, and Mary
Ellen Ladouceur, ‘‘A New Way Forward for Remote Vendor
Sales Tax Collection,’’ State Tax Notes, Jan. 18, 2010, p. 187,
Doc 2009-28458, or 2010 STT 11-2 (‘‘Moreover, for legitimate
reasons, approximately half the states imposing a sales tax,
including California, Texas, Florida, New York, Illinois, and
Pennsylvania, have not chosen to join SSUTA’’); Swain and
Hellerstein, supra note 95, at 612-616 (describing potentially
divergent local interests).
97Justice Louis Brandeis famously praised the states as
laboratories of democracy in his dissent in New State Ice Co.
v. Lieberman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing).
98Evaluating the constitutionality of these approaches is
beyond the scope of this article. For our purposes, it suffices to
note that these strategies are constitutionally questionable
and that they are in any case unlikely to be effective. In
contrast, as we have already mentioned, we agree with the
U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado that the
information reporting requirements approach is unconstitu-
tional (unless combined with providing adequate vendor
compensation). Gamage and Heckman, supra note 1.
99Gamage and Heckman, supra note 1, at notes 13-16.
100See, e.g., Swain, supra note 94, at 363 (‘‘The physical
presence test is not an effective tool for sorting out relative
burdens among taxpayers’’).
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within the state, but we think the case for requiring
states to compensate remote e-commerce vendors for
tax compliance costs is much stronger. A vendor
acquires physical presence within a taxing jurisdic-
tion by purposefully choosing to locate operations
within that jurisdiction. By doing so, the vendor
knowingly becomes subject to a wide variety of local
laws and regulations. A vendor should thus choose to
maintain physical presence within a jurisdiction
only if selling to customers within that jurisdiction
is of more than incidental importance to the vendor’s
business. In contrast, a remote e-commerce vendor
may end up selling within a taxing jurisdiction
because of customers within that jurisdiction find-
ing the vendor’s website, without the e-commerce
vendor making any purposeful decision to sell to
that jurisdiction.
That a vendor has physical presence within a
jurisdiction suggests that the vendor derives signifi-
cant value from selling to that jurisdiction.101 Un-
doubtedly, when determining the importance of sell-
ing into a jurisdiction, evaluating the amount of
sales in a jurisdiction would be a better proxy than
physical presence. But courts are poorly equipped to
design quantitative tests such as evaluating the
magnitude of sales.102
We recognize that our argument here blurs com-
merce clause considerations with due process clause
considerations. But the commerce clause is properly
concerned with preventing states and local taxing
jurisdictions from disproportionately burdening
multistate vendors with tax compliance costs. By
creating a permissive due process clause test for
when states can tax remote vendors, Quill left the
commerce clause as the primary deterrent to states’
imposing excess compliance costs on multistate ven-
dors conducting only a small magnitude of sales
within a state or local taxing jurisdiction. Again,
because courts have no ready means for evaluating
what amount of sales is significant, physical pres-
ence can function as a rough proxy for the impor-
tance a vendor places on selling into a jurisdiction.
We would therefore oppose the Supreme Court’s
overturning Quill as long as Quill is interpreted to
permit our proposed approach for the states to tax
interstate e-commerce while providing adequate
vendor compensation. We admit that our approach
would grant multistate e-commerce vendors a small
tax cost advantage over multistate physical retailers
(with the advantage being equal to the magnitude of
tax compliance costs).103 But we find that weakness
of our approach considerably less troubling than
would be overturning Quill and allowing the states
to burden interstate commerce by imposing excess
tax compliance costs on multistate e-commerce ven-
dors lacking physical presence. Whereas a retailer
with physical presence must be rather large in order
to make sales within thousands of taxing jurisdic-
tions, even a small e-commerce retailer may end up
selling across the entire United States. Moreover,
the tax cost advantage that our approach would
grant to remote e-commerce vendors is much
smaller than the tax cost advantage those vendors
currently enjoy because of their being shielded from
both direct tax costs and tax compliance costs.
Arguably, excess tax compliance costs represent
only a small burden for the largest e-commerce
vendors like Amazon.104 Yet even a small burden on
interstate commerce is worth preventing to the
extent possible. If forced to choose between com-
pletely overturning Quill and thereby allowing
states to tax remote vendors without restriction or
interpreting Quill so that states would not be al-
lowed to tax remote vendors even with compensa-
tion for all tax compliance costs, we prefer the
former approach. But we continue to believe that our
interpretation of Quill provides a better way for-
ward than either of these alternatives. Unlike the
alternatives, our approach permits the states to
raise most of the revenue available from taxing
interstate e-commerce without creating any burden
on interstate commerce.
Moreover, focusing on the potential burden on the
largest e-commerce vendors like Amazon ignores the
strongest arguments for the physical presence rule.
Excess compliance costs are potentially far more
burdensome to smaller e-commerce vendors.105 A
state might alleviate that concern by using a high
threshold for the amount of sales within the state
that would trigger a remote e-commerce vendor
being subject to use taxation. But adopting such a
101This connection is far from perfect, and the absence of
physical presence does not imply that a vendor does not gain
significant value from selling into a jurisdiction. Still, the
maintenance of physical presence is not meaningless; for
instance, it also serves as a rough proxy for representation in
the political process. See Edward A. Zelinsky, ‘‘Rethinking Tax
Nexus and Apportionment: Voice, Exit, and the Dormant
Commerce Clause,’’ 28 Va. Tax Rev. 1, 51-59 (2008). Courts
need not protect in-state vendors by requiring reimbursement
of tax compliance costs, because in-state vendors are able to
advocate for their own interests in the local political process
by leveraging the benefits they bring to the state. In contrast,
remote vendors may not have the same leverage.
102Swain, supra note 94, at 364.
103But a state could alleviate that advantage by also
adequately compensating in-state vendors for sales and use
tax compliance costs.
104As Michael Mazerov has explained, Amazon already
collects sales taxes for other companies that sell on its
website, implying that the burden of doing so is not prohibi-
tive. Mazerov, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, ‘‘Ama-
zon’s Arguments Against Collecting Sales Taxes Do Not
Withstand Scrutiny,’’ 4-5 (2010), available at http://
www.cbpp.org/files/11-16-09sfp.pdf.
105Supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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high threshold would in effect discriminate against
large e-commerce vendors, granting small remote
e-commerce vendors an unfair tax advantage com-
pared with both their larger competitors and with
in-state vendors of all sizes.106 Again, we might
support that outcome if the only alternative were to
completely prohibit states from subjecting any re-
mote vendors to use taxation. But our proposed
approach would allow the states to better tailor their
thresholds so as to only exempt from use taxation
those remote vendors that conduct a truly minimal
amount of sales within the state.
D. Implications for Congress
By holding that only the commerce clause pre-
vents states from imposing use tax compliance obli-
gations on the major e-commerce vendors — and
that the due process clause does not — Quill opened
the door for Congress to regulate state taxation of
interstate e-commerce.107 There have since been
repeated calls by scholars and state tax officials for
Congress to authorize the states to subject remote
vendors to use taxation.108 Many of these commen-
tators have suggested that Congress require the
states to unify and simplify their sales and use taxes
along specified dimensions as a precondition for
allowing the states to tax interstate e-commerce.109
Congress has so far shown little inclination to
expand the states’ ability to tax interstate com-
merce.110 When Congress has chosen to act, it ‘‘has
generally adopted even greater nexus protections’’
rather than facilitating state taxation of remote
vendors.111 Nevertheless, many commentators con-
tinue to hope that Congress will eventually resolve
the problems created by Quill.112 The most note-
worthy recent action along these lines is the Main
Street Fairness Act, which is sponsored by Sen.
Richard J. Durbin, D-Ill., and Rep. John Conyers Jr.,
D-Mich.113 The act would authorize the states to
extend their use taxes to reach remote vendors but
would only do so for states that agree to the Stream-
lined Sales and Use Tax Agreement — a multistate
compact for simplifying and unifying sales and use
taxes.114
We have argued that congressional action is un-
necessary for the states to reach remote vendors
with their use taxes as long as the states are willing
to compensate the remote vendors for all tax com-
pliance costs thereby imposed. But if Congress does
decide to pass legislation enabling the states to tax
remote vendors, or if the courts rule against our
proposed solution, making such action necessary, we
urge Congress to allow the states to impose use tax
compliance obligations on remote vendors only if the
states compensate the remote vendors for all tax
compliance costs. Furthermore, we exhort Congress
not to place any additional simplification or unifica-
tion requirements on the states beyond conditioning
their abilities to impose use tax compliance obliga-
tions on remote vendors on the states also compen-
sating the remote vendors for all use tax compliance
costs. Rather than force the states to adopt a specific
form of simplification and unification as a precondi-
tion for taxing remote vendors, Congress should give
the states incentives to unify and simplify their tax
systems while allowing each state the flexibility to
decide how to balance the goals of simplification and
unification against local interests that might call for
divergent tax design.115 Hence, even if Congress
decides to clarify the scope of the commerce clause,
we urge it to adopt our proposed approach as the
best way forward for state taxation of e-commerce.
Conclusion
From the beginning, it has been understood that
Quill’s separate holdings for the due process clause
and the commerce clause means that Congress can
authorize the states to tax remote vendors.116 Never-
theless, in light of Congress’s failure to act, state tax
practitioners have come to see Quill as a limitation
on states’ taxing powers. That Quill actually ex-
panded states’ taxing powers regarding the due
106For instance, Amazon has opposed federal legislation
that would set a threshold of $5 million in annual nationwide
sales, arguing that such a high threshold would grant small
e-commerce vendors an unfair tax cost advantage as com-
pared with larger e-commerce vendors (like Amazon) and
against small Main Street retailers. Mazerov, supra note 104,
at 8-9. We think Amazon has a valid argument on that point.
107Swain, supra note 94, at 346.
108E.g., id. at 370; Edward A. Zelinsky, ‘‘New York Appel-
late Division Upholds ‘Amazon’ Law: Analysis,’’ State Tax
Notes, Jan. 10, 2011, p. 93, Doc 2010-26057, or 2011 STT 6-1.
109See Hellerstein, supra note 4, at 549-550 (describing a
‘‘broad consensus among academic tax specialists regarding
general principles,’’ including the need for simplification to
make destination-based taxation of sales feasible).
110See, e.g., Griffith, supra note 42, at 352 (‘‘Congress has
historically been reluctant to address state revenue issues,
preferring instead to leave tax administration to the states’’);
Swain and Hellerstein, supra note 95, at 615.
111Swain, supra note 94, at 370.
112E.g., Zelinsky, supra note 108, at 104.
113Press release, National Taxpayers Union, ‘‘Beware of
Fiscal Potholes in Congress’s Latest ‘Main Street Fairness
Act,’ Taxpayer Group Warns’’ (July 29, 2011), available at
http://www.ntu.org/news-and-issues/taxes/729-beware-of-fis
cal-potholes-in.html.
114Id. For discussion of the SSUTA, see sources cited supra
note 95.
115For a previous proposal along these lines, see Mikesell,
supra note 5. See also Plattner et al., supra note 96, at 191.
(‘‘A major problem with the streamlined approach is that it
offers a ‘one size fits all’ solution to states whose circum-
stances widely differ.’’)
116Quill, 504 U.S., at 318-19 (majority opinion).
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process clause has received comparatively little at-
tention. Because Quill has come to stand so firmly in
practitioners’ minds as a victory for remote vendors,
there has been little inquiry into the implications of
Quill’s overturning the physical presence rule re-
garding the due process clause. Even those who
argue that states should be able to tax remote
vendors have focused their rhetoric on criticizing
Quill’s commerce clause holding.117
We believe that Quill’s due
process clause holding is
potentially far more important than
its commerce clause holding.
In contrast, we believe that Quill’s due process
clause holding is potentially far more important
than its commerce clause holding. The Quill major-
ity made clear that it was upholding Bellas Hess’s
physical presence rule regarding the commerce
clause because ‘‘it is not inconsistent with Complete
Auto and our recent cases.’’118 The Quill majority
further explained that upholding the physical pres-
ence rule based on the commerce clause is compat-
ible with Complete Auto because the physical pres-
ence rule serves to ‘‘limit the reach of state taxing
authority so as to ensure that state taxation does not
unduly burden interstate commerce.’’119 The Quill
majority then cited Bellas Hess to explain that the
potential burden on interstate commerce that justi-
fied upholding the physical presence rule results
from the excess tax compliance costs that ‘‘might be
imposed by the Nation’s 6,000-plus taxing jurisdic-
tions.’’120 By basing the potential burden on inter-
state commerce on excess tax compliance costs —
rather than on direct tax costs — the Quill majority
reconciled the physical presence rule with Complete
Auto’s affirmation that it is ‘‘‘not the purpose of the
commerce clause to relieve those engaged in inter-
state commerce from their just share of state tax
burden even though it increases the cost of doing
business.’’’121
As we have argued, the very steps the Quill
majority took to demonstrate that a physical pres-
ence rule under the commerce clause is compatible
with Complete Auto and other modern commerce
clause cases limit the scope of the physical presence
rule to apply only when remote vendors might be
burdened by excess tax compliance costs. As a result,
the physical presence rule should not apply if states
fully and adequately compensate remote vendors for
all tax compliance costs such that there is no poten-
tial for burdening interstate commerce. Any other
interpretation of Quill would be incompatible with
Complete Auto and would thus contradict the Quill
majority’s justification for upholding the physical
presence rule under the commerce clause because ‘‘it
is not inconsistent with Complete Auto and our
recent cases.’’122
Quill’s expansion of state taxing powers regard-
ing the due process clause thus paves the way for
our proposed solution of adequate vendor compensa-
tion as an effective and constitutional means for
states to tax interstate e-commerce. We urge the
states to adopt our approach, either on its own or in
combination with the existing state Amazon law
strategies. We predict that once the states begin to
do so, there will be a rapid end to the sales and use
tax exemption currently enjoyed by Amazon and the
other major e-commerce vendors, moving us toward
a fairer and more efficient multistate sales and use
tax regime. ✰
117E.g., Swain, supra note 94, at 356-365.
118Quill, 504 U.S., at 311.
119Id. at 313.
120Id. at 313 n.6.
121Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279
(1977) (quoting W. Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S.
250, 254 (1938)).
122Quill, 504 U.S. at 311.
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